Searching for a solution to the Rubik's cube: Internet as a complex set of commons by Montaldo, Stefano
SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION TO THE RUBIK’S CUBE: THE INTERNET 
AS A COMPLEX SET OF COMMONS
Stefano Montaldo
Ph.D. in EU Law – Research assistant in EU Law
University of Turin – Department of Law
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. The Internet, a multi-faceted Rubik’s Cube breaking into the commons 
scenario –  2. The public goods Rubik’s Cube: the evolution of the category of the commons. 2.1. 
Commons, common pool resources and club goods: different combination of excludability and 
subtractability. 2.2 The broad application of the notion of commons: new sides of the Rubik’s Cube? – 3. 
Even more complex than a Rubik’s Cube? The Internet: a multi-layered technology- driven and human 
made  set  of  commons.  3.1.  The  attempts  to  solve  the  twisty  puzzle:  Internet  complexity  in  multi-
disciplinary  literature.  3.2. Solving  the  cube  layer  by  layer:  a  feasible  method  to  address  Internet  
commons. – 4. Twisting each piece of the Cube: Net complexity in the perspective of common resources. 
4.1. The backbone of the Net: infrastructures and material equipment.  4.2. The functional immaterial  
level: technical standards, domain names, software. 4.3. The content layer. – 5. From individual attempts 
to solve the Rubik’s Cube to general applicable algorithms. Internet commons, something more complex 
than a  twisty  puzzle:  conclusions,  challenges,  perspectives.  5.1. The interconnection between  private  
property and public Internet goods. 5.2. Common resources, the broadband and the principle of network 
neutrality. 5.3. Domain names and IP addresses: advances and pitfalls of the centralized management of  
common resources.
1. Introduction. The Internet, a multi-faceted Rubik’s Cube breaking into 
the commons scenario.
According to economic literature, solving the problems of the commons usually 
entails two distinct elements: restricting access to the resource and creating incentives 
for users to invest in it - instead of overexploiting or incorrectly using it - for instance 
by assigning them individual rights or shares of the resource. As far as the Internet is 
concerned, this mechanism works on a different  stage,  as  it  entails  the search for  a 
proper balance between regulation (that is to say the multi-layered governance model of 
the Net and the role of the local,  national  and international bodies in charge of the 
administration of the resource), individual rights (freedom of expression and thought, 
the emerging and debated fourth generation right to have access to the Internet and to its 
contents)  and  the  access  to  Net  resources  (individual  responsibility  and  the  limits 
applicable to one’s activity on the web). As it will be argued, today the Internet is not 
facing widespread problems of exclusion and depletion anymore. Still, its ontological 
complexity raises several debated questions, which have to be carefully addressed.
The Internet, as an essential and strategic resource, is under many points of view 
the target of several forms of (direct and indirect – global and local) forms of control 
and appropriation,  despite its global aspirations.  This issue reflects the multi-layered 
institutional governance model of the Net, in relation to both general policies and the 
management  of  network  infrastructures,  but  also  the  significant  commercial 
potentialities of the web.
The article is based on these premises and tries to suggest a reading of some of 
the  most  controversial  issues  the  scholarly  debate  is  focused  on.  In  particular,  the 
reference point of the analysis is the category of the commons, which has been to a 
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certain extent applied to the Net. 
First  of  all,  we  will  sketch  an  overview  of  the  evolution  of  the  notion  of 
commons and its sub-sets, such as common pool resources, global public goods and 
club goods. The second step is a review of the main visions expressed in literature as to 
the inclusion of Internet resources among the commons. Indeed, it has often been listed 
among the new commons, due to its  technological-driven essence,  but its  increasing 
complexity allows for a more detailed approach.
The  fourth  paragraph  is  then  focused  on  the  multi-layered  structure  of  the 
Internet,  whose nature  must  be read through the de-composition of  the various  and 
highly different goods it is composed of. In fact, the Internet cannot be considered a 
commons  itself,  but  must  be  scrutinized  in  the  light  of  the  specific  features  of  its 
material backbone, of the technical standards and protocols he is based on and of the 
different kinds of contents users can benefit from. Each of these goods has different 
characteristics and sheds a light on some of the key-challenges the Internet is facing.
To this respect, the final remarks are intended to suggest further reflections on 
such questions, in particular the interconnections between private property and public 
goods in the daily functioning of the network;  the status of  technical  standards and 
protocols  which  enable  the  Internet  to  perform  communication  processes  among 
computers;  the  end  to  end  architecture  and  the  attacks  to  the  principle  of  network 
neutrality, the centralized and collective management of the domain name system. All of 
these  question  are  analyzed  from  the  perspective  of  the  dichotomy  “private 
appropriation – open public goods”, as a possible criterion for the interpretation of the 
current challenges the Internet is undergoing.
Since one of the core arguments is centered on the complexity of the Internet, we 
propose to apply to compare it  metaphorically to a Rubik’s Cube, a multi-sided and 
multi-colored switch puzzle whose layers and pieces can move independently from the 
overall structure and whose solution is much less evident than it seems.
2. The public goods and the Rubik’s Cube: the evolution of the category of 
the commons.
2.1. Commons, common pool resources and club goods: different combination of 
excludability and subtractability.
There is  no clear vision in literature as  to the most suitable definition of the 
commons. This is mainly due to the variety of the entities at hand and to the extremely 
flexible and rapidly evolving boundaries of the notion. Nonetheless,  the commons are 
usually characterized by a series of distinctive factors, which we can detect in most of 
the examples considered by scholars.
The notion of commons refers to a set of resources which are conceived to be 
neither private nor public, but commonly owned or managed. In particular, Elinor 
Ostrom has  stressed the importance of distinguishing between commons and common 
property, the latter being represented by formal or informal sets of rules allocating rights 
and duties to a group, usually by the means of public institutions (Ostrom, 1990).
In general, this is mainly due to their peculiarities and to their strategic (and in 
many cases essential) cultural, social, environmental, economic, political importance for 
a community, being the latter a small village or mankind as a whole. The concept then 
avoids the traditional idea of public or private property, embracing the sharing of a 
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resource by all the members of a community. 
The key biophysical features of common goods are non-excludability and non-
rival  consumption.  Therefore, they are easily accessible to  any user  and difficult  to 
exclude,  but  they  cannot –  or at least shouldn’t –  be enclosed by individuals, 
corporations or by the high aims of national sovereignty. In fact, they are conceived 
«the shared heritage of us all»  and should be granted for everyone’s benefit (Rowe, 
2001).
Accordingly, everyone should take advantage from the preservation  of these 
resources, which should be at the same time kept for the benefit of future generations 
and, in case, properly consumed by individuals, in order to avoid their depletion 
(Shackelford, 2009). People  should  then  exhibit  mutual  trust,  habits  and  skills  of 
cooperation, public spirit and rational approach in order to sustain common resources 
against the risky tendency to abuse or enclose them (Levine, 2001).
The last point is particularly important, since the spread and individualized 
exploitation of a shared resource by each member of a group, by private companies or 
public authorities risks to undermine at the roots its preservation or its quality. The 
danger inferred by the sharing of a resource necessary for the individuals of a 
community was defined as “The tragedy of the Commons”, the well-known title of an 
highly influential article by Garrett Hardin dating back to 1968 (Hardin, 1968). 
According to Hardin’s argument –  which in these decades has been thoroughly 
scrutinized, traditionally upheld, but often criticized or developed further on (Feeny, 
1990;  Aquilera-Klink,  1994)  –  the users of a commons are the main actors of the 
tragedy on the stage. Being unaware of the overall situation and of the costs suffered by 
their fellows and the community as a whole because of their conduct, they make 
demands on a good until their needs are satisfied at the expected costs. This process 
leads to the destruction of the resources the individuals depend on or take benefit from 
and it is therefore necessary to search for an effective solution in order to avoid such 
tragic and undesirable finale of the play. 
While Hardin’s proposed solution was to search for a shelter under the 
encouraging paradigm of property regime – either on a socialist or a free market basis – 
several commentators have underlined the urgent need for a proper balance between 
individual expectations and community needs. Their main argument is the existence of 
remarkable examples of efficiently jointly managed commons in various different local 
communities.
The struggle between comedy and tragedy then takes place on a fine thread, 
which proves to be particularly thin in relation to some of the goods traditionally 
considered in literature: natural, essential and limited resources, such as freshwaters, 
fisheries, forests and grasslands.
This kind of resources has gradually led to a further attempt to find its marks, by 
setting up different categories in relation to the combinations of the two mentioned key-
factors of the commons. To this regard, economists started to conceptualize the idea of 
common pool resources (CPRs), as from the middle of the fifties (Samuelson, 1954). 
The  definition  is a metaphor which evokes the problems of congestion and over-
exploitation deriving from the difficulty to manage systematically individual uses and 
ambitions of enclosure with regard to some goods (Ostrom, Gardner, Walker, 1994). 
CPRs,  therefore,  are  characterized  by  subtractability  and  by  the  risk  of  over 
exploitation. Excessive consumption derives from the difficulty – often in terms of costs 
and  infrastructures  –  in  preventing  unauthorized  beneficiaries  from using  them and 
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results in rival consumption.
A notable contribution to the subject has been brought by Elinor Ostrom, whose 
analysis has shown a feasible and economically efficient alternative to public or private 
property, that is to say self-management of the resource by local communities, with due 
respect of social, cultural, economic and environmental features of each area concerned 
(Ostrom, 1999). In particular, Elinor Ostrom has  tried to translate into generally 
valuable theories and empirical models the cases she has been considering. In particular, 
she has proposed the adaptive governance as a sacheme for the management of CPRs, 
grounded on five fundamental pillars: collecting up-to-date and comprehensive 
information; dealing with conflicts and solving them quickly; enhancing rule 
compliance; providing infrastructures; encouraging adaptation and change.
A  further  combination  of  the  constitutive  elements  of  the  commons  has 
originated the concept of club or toll goods, which are excludable but non rival. Indeed, 
the category entails all circumstances in which the chance to benefit from the use of a 
resource  is  in  theory  unclosed,  but  in  practice  subject  to  the  owner  or  manager’s 
authorization.  The  latter  is  usually  dependent  on  the  payment  of  a  fee  or  further 
conditions  allowing for  the selection of  the  users.  In  this  perspective,  the access  to 
telephone  communication  infrastructures  appears  to  be  a  widespread  example.  By 
boosting its boundaries to the maximum extent, some commentators have even applied 
the category to the Eropean Union, due to the procedures and criteria which candidate 
Member States need to meet to join the international organization (Ahrens, Hoen, Ohr, 
2005).
2.2. The broad application of the notion of commons: new sides of the Rubik’s 
Cube?
Even if the categories under consideration have often been linked to natural 
elements and to the subsequent risk of man-made damages, the notions have gradually 
evolved, thus also embracing “new commons”, such as  artificial or immaterial goods 
(Hess, 2008).
As from the nineties, the deepening of the interdisciplinary studies has then 
given shape to a new era of the subject, characterized by the attempt to apply the 
traditional paradigm to sharply different elements. New commons are mainly 
represented by human-made and technology-driven phenomena, but also resources 
related to individuals’ fundamental rights are now taken into consideration, as in the 
case of health-care commons (Cassel, Brennan, 2007). Indeed, a general overview of the 
scientific literature on the matter shows a certain degree of creativity, together with the 
tendency to expand the borders of the concept to the largest extent possible. According 
to social scientists, for instance, commons should include surfer’s waves (Rider, 1998), 
sports (Bird, Wagner, 1997), public radio (Brunner, 1998), traditional music (McCann, 
1995) air slots (Sened, Riker, 1996), campus commons (Boal, 1998); urban commons 
such  as  apartment  communities,  residential  community associations,  streets,  parking 
places,  playgrounds  and  reclaimed  buildings  (Oakerson,  1999);  highways  and 
transboundary transportation  systems,  (Van Vugt,  1996);  tourism landscapes  (Healy, 
1995); cultural treasures (Sax, 1999); car sharing institutions (Prettenhaler, Steininger, 
1999) and sewage (Svderberg, 1997).
The set of commons has then be read in conjunction with health-care resources, 
among which some authors enumerate antimicrobial resistance (d’Oronzio, 1994) and 
with the so called neighborhood or hometown commons, that is to say public spaces, 
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squares, green and gardens, or even security and the respect of tolerable levels of noise 
in urban contexts (Foster, 2006). Also, the existence of several cultural commons has 
been  promoted,  involving  public  art,  music,  spiritual  heritage,  landscapes;  another 
category can be represented by knowledge commons, whose importance has increased 
sharply in modern societies. 
Finally,  some  scholars  have  detected  a  group  of  global  commons  –  usually 
referred to as global public goods – whose importance places them at the top of the 
pyramid  of  the  resources  which  must  be  preserved  for  the  benefit  of  the  future 
generations  (Buck,  1998).  This category includes  financial  stability,  climate change-
related issues, biodiversity, atmosphere, global genetic commons and so forth. 
The flourishing of the  commons has put traditional theories under pressure. In 
particular, some of the new resources clearly show peculiar features, whose connection 
with  the  mentioned  biophysical  characteristics  of  the  commons  is  feeble,  thereby 
highlighting  the  need  for  a  more  attentive  analysis.  The  definition  itself  of  “new 
commons”,  indeed,  is  to  a  certain  extent  troublesome,  since  it  has  been  used  with 
different meanings in literature, in order to include resources which go far beyond the 
barriers of Hardin’s paradigm.
From a terminological point of view, the notion of  new commons  may raise 
negative connotations which obscure the fact that “old”  resources are in any case the 
result of dynamic institutional choices and governance schemes, subject to constant 
change thanks to internal or external factors and to technological development. A more 
cautious theoretical reading  of  the  phenomenon  would then suggest the need for a 
reinvention of the category, in favor of the challenges brought by institutional and 
cultural debate and by technological development. 
Some scholars have argued on the increasing importance of technology for the 
content of the notions of commons, common pool resources and club goods. Many of 
the newly classified elements «have until recently remained unclaimed due to the lack 
of technology for extracting their value and for establishing and sustaining property 
rights» (Ostrom, 1992). Inevitably, the categories are then reinvented mostly thanks to 
the new frontiers of technology: some resources can be captured only through modern 
technologies (space,  or  even the Arctic  region and its  hidden natural  treasures  have 
recently become a strategic land of  conquest);  others  are priced and empowered by 
technology (renewable energies, irrigation methods); many man-made resources are to a 
large extent dependent on technology and its landings.
3. Even more complex than a Rubik’s Cube? The Internet: a multi-layered 
technology-driven and human made set of commons.
3.1.  The  attempts  to  solve  the  twisty  puzzle:  Internet  complexity  in  multi-
disciplinary literature.
In  this  entangled  and  movable  context,  the  Internet  appears  to  be  the  most 
complex  and  challenging of  the  new (or,  we may say,  technological)  commons.  Its 
complexity derives first of all from the interlinked system of technologies, contents and 
multi-layered legal or institutional regimes. Secondly, the model of governance of the 
Net,  characterized  by  the  coexistence  of  national  sovereignty  claims  and  the 
universalistic  ambitions  of  the  resource,  as  well  as  by  the  contribution  of  several 
international  bodies  to  its  development,  reveals  the  continuous  search  for  a  proper 
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balance between enclosure, shared management and exploitation (Oddenino, 2008).
Once again, as from the nineties, many authors have proposed different views of 
the  Internet  from the  perspective  of  common  resources.  This  is  mainly  due  to  the 
evoked factors of complexity, but also to the fact that the operational potentialities of 
the Internet have increasingly (and sometimes surprisingly) grown in a very brief lapse 
of time, thanks to what has been defined a true scientific revolution (Dyson, 1999). 
Besides this, the first comments on the nature of the phenomenon sometimes manifested 
a certain degree of ideological transport: according to Lessig, «Internet is an aberration 
in a property obsessed era, [a] space anyone can enter and take what she finds without 
the permission of a librarian or a promise to pay» (Lessig, 1999).
An  overview  of  the  main  issues  raised  in  literature  highlights  two  different 
trends. On the one hand, as already mentioned, Internet has been considered a set of 
specific  common  resources,  such  as  information  commons,  social  commons  and 
technological  infrastructure  commons  (Cahir,  2004;  Zdarsky,  Martinovic,  Schmit, 
2006). The Net would play a prominent role among knowledge commons, since users 
benefit from free access to huge amount and variety of information and contents. In the 
meanwhile,  it  has  also  been  listed  –  together  with  transportation  systems  and 
communication networks - among the infrastructure commons, due to the technological 
material backbone it is based on (Little, 2005). To a certain extent, Internet has also 
been  identified  as  a  global  public  good,  a  powerful  source  of  knowledge  sharing, 
communication and development for the entire world, in particular for less developed 
countries, where the digital divide represents a stumbling block (Fattal, 2004).
On  the  other  hand,  some  scholars  have  tried  to  apply  to  this  context  the 
traditional  notions.  The  latter  have  identified  the  classic  failures  of  overuse  and 
mismanagement in the collateral effects of free-riding, such as information pollution, 
misuses for committing crimes, individual overexploitation (Hess, 1995).
Accordingly, some commentators have pointed out the risk of a congestion of the 
web, being individual users fully unaware of the comprehensive status of the system 
and not charged with adequate responsibilities in proportion to their uses (Huberman, 
Lokose,  1997).  Under  this  point  of  view,  the  originally  limited  possibilities  to 
accumulate indefinite and contextual  individual  uses  brought  some commentators  to 
focus on the reach of the bandwidth: «Key common resource is not an open pasture, but  
bandwidth» (Kollock, Smith, 1996). On the contrary, Hess prophesied the overtaking of 
these  technical  limitations  negatively influencing  the  access  to  the  Internet  and  the 
availability of its contents, thereby defining the bandwidth as a community commons 
which could have been properly managed and developed for the benefit of any user 
(Hess, 1995). As we will see, such concerns are still relevant today, because of the harsh 
debate over the appropriation of the structures providing for the large bandwidth.
At  the same time,  it  has  been argued  that  the  institutional  and  technological 
branches which compose the growing tree of the Internet are not balanced, since the fast 
development of the latter is not accompanied by a parallel rush by legal institutions, 
unable  to  adapt  and  catch  it  up  (Benkler,  1998).  This  point  has  gained  particular 
consensus as to wireless communications, with a widespread criticism on the delay of 
outdated  and  inappropriate  regulatory  institutions  to  deal  with  new  spectrum 
technologies.  More in  general,  the  two-speeds evolution of  technical  standards  (and 
potentialities) and of the institutional approach to Internet-related questions has raised 
the attention of the scholars, who have always been attentive in scrutinizing the role 
played  by  ICANN  and  the  other  global  institutions  and  bodies  for  Internet 
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administration.
3.2.  Solving  the  Cube  layer  by  layer:  a  feasible  method  to  address  Internet  
commons.
The multidisciplinary approach to the commons and to the complex essence of 
the  Internet  itself  draws  an  extremely  heterogeneous  and  composite  scenario.  This 
complex background allows for some reflections on the main features of the Net as a 
shared resource.
First of all, even if in the past it was argued that «congestion of the Internet is a 
present and potentially paralyzing public bad»,  claiming for strict regulations and 
adequate tariffs to control individual uses (Gupta, 1997), the traditional paradigm of the 
tragedy of commons is hardly applicable to the access to the web. Unlike ordinary 
common pool resources – and in particular natural resources – the Internet usually is not 
characterized by subtractability, a feature that Gardner and Ostrom list among the 
fundamental conditions for a common pool resource dilemma (Gardner, Ostrom, 1990). 
In relation to many resources available electronically, modern technologies allow for the 
overtaking of any fear for excessive exploitation and subsequent exhaustion, as it 
occurred for bandwidth at the beginning of the Internet revolution. Instead, the logic 
underpinning the offer of contents on the Internet is reverse: web sites try to maximize 
their use, by attracting as many users as possible, in order to widely disseminate the 
information they provide or increase revenues through advertising. Moreover, on many 
occasions cyber-resources seek for the active contribution of each user. 
On the one hand, individuals’ participation is often requested in case of open-
source software, commonly shared websites or other digital products, whose 
development and improvement is highly dependent on the sharing of knowledge, 
comments and experiences by users. On the other hand, the Internet is a powerful 
vehicle for information sharing and knowledge diffusion. Some scholars have in 
particular resumed these characteristics theorizing the role it is playing in fostering 
global democracy (Levine, 2002). Obviously, access and participation lean on different 
levels of the stage: while it is relatively simple to provide facilities and contents for the 
access, positive contribution entails the sharing of rules, behaviors and sometimes even 
values distinctive of an Internet community. 
If  considered from this perspective,  the Internet could be seen as a commons 
which meets the requisites Elinor Ostrom enumerates to identify a non-problematic 
common pool resource, where contents are to a certain extent shared by users without 
limited access or benefit dilemmas asking for external solutions and limitations to 
individual expectations (Ostrom, 1990).
The size and complexity of the Internet are therefore at the same time factors 
allowing  individuals  to  take  benefit  from it  without  the  risk  of  exclusion,  but  also 
represent an obstacle for the analysis of its essence. The presumed absence of evident 
“tragedy of the commons” concerns actually doesn’t mean that the Internet is immune 
to problems and limitations under the perspective of its fully shared management and 
development.
The  potentialities  expressed  by the  Internet  in  terms of  increasingly massive 
amount  of  shared  information  and  infrastructural  management  have  in  their  turn 
inspired the need for a distinction among different common Internet-related resources. 
Actually, before analyzing the features and the limits of the Internet as a commons, it is 
interesting to  note that  literature  has  granted  to  it  a  fundamental  importance  in  the 
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attempts to sketch a taxonomy of modern shared resources.
Many authors advance the Internet as a key-pawn on the undefined and evolving 
chessboard of  the scientific  study of the subject.  In  fact,  it  is  a  subset  of  a  general 
category and it is included in the groups of technology-driven commons, but at the same 
time  it  implies  and  fosters  different  sub-categories  of  resources.  Such  internal 
complexity first of all entails the layer of the physical and material facilities through 
which  technology  is  expressed,  the  backbone  of  the  whole  system  (Hess,  1995). 
Secondly, technical standards, domain names, applications and software represent the 
logical subset, thanks to which the Internet is enabled to work and is managed (Abbate, 
1999).  Lastly,  some scholars mainly focus on the contents of the Net,  that  is  to say 
immaterial information exchange and knowledge commons (Greco, Floridi, 2004).
These  three  distinct  levels  embody essential  components  of  the  Internet,  but 
reveal extremely different features (Benkler, 2006). Moreover, in their turn, they involve 
further  subset  of  goods,  each  of  them functioning as  a  single  colored piece  of  our 
metaphoric Rubik’s Cube, capable of moving independently from the others.
In conclusion, the Internet turns out to be an autonomous habitat where a variety 
of species of different resources – material and immaterial; private, public and common 
– live and flourish. As a consequence, any in-depth analysis of such phenomenon leads 
us to avoid a unilateral approach: the notion must be broken down in all the pieces it is 
composed by.
Therefore,  bearing in  mind the extensive solutions  proposed  in  literature,  we 
propose to solve the ambiguity of the notion of commons referred to technology-driven 
and human made resources by considering step by step each of the three levels which 
the Net can be de-structured in: infrastructures layer; functional layer and content layer.
4. Twisting each piece of  the Cube: Net complexity in the perspective of 
common resources.
4.1. The backbone of the Net: infrastructures and material equipment.
According  to  a  scholarly wide  definition,  the  Internet  can  be  described  as  a 
system allowing for communication of several kinds of contents between users (Solum, 
Chung, 2003). If we look at the Net from this point of view, the first step of the analysis 
must be focused on the nature of the physical devices which enable communication. 
Hardware  components  include  an  increasing  number  of  tools,  which  intervene  at 
different  levels  in  the  communications  process:  wires,  wireless  networks,  routers, 
mobile devices and, of course, computers.
In most cases, almost paradoxically, the key-components allowing for netsurfing 
and  all  the  subsequent  activities  reveal  a  surprising combination of  the  biophysical 
features of the commons: they are at the same time characterized by excludability and 
rival consumption. In a few words: they are purely private goods. 
This is in particular true for computer hardware, which are usually devoted to 
individual use or owned by private or public organizations, where access is authorized 
only to a set of specified beneficiaries. Nonetheless, if we take a closer look, we may 
notice that, when connected to the Net, these strictly private resources are transformed 
into bridges  for the sharing of contents,  knowledge or even disk storage.  Moreover, 
some peer to peer communities take benefit from the powers of the computers hooked to 
the Internet. A perfect example is represented by Skype community, run by a company 
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which exploits the users’ devices to set up VoIP connection, thereby allowing for free 
phone or video calls and for the commercial provision of such activity (Hofmokl, 2010).
Telephone  cables  are  private  goods  as  well,  but  the  management  and 
maintenance  of  the  whole  infrastructure  implies  huge  costs,  which  make  personal 
property impossible. In practice, the material skeleton of the network is owned by large 
telecommunication companies, enjoying an oligopolistic or even monopolistic position 
on  the  market.  Due  to  this  situation,  companies  are  strictly  supervised  by  public 
authorities  and the commercial  exploitation of  such peculiar private goods is  highly 
regulated.
The picture  is  further  diversified  by wireless  networks.  Originally,  the  limits 
imposed by technological development made such networks a clear example of CPR. In 
fact,  they interfered  with  radio  waves  spectrum,  which  is  a  scarce  resource  rivalry 
exploited. Nowadays, wireless networks are undergoing a significant evolution, since 
more efficient receivers are able to distinguish between the different sources of signals 
and  certain  frequencies  can  therefore  be  shared  (Benkler,  2006).  Technological 
development  has  then  sketched  a  fragmented  painting,  where  commercial  wireless 
networks  provided  by telecommunication  companies  are  accompanied  by municipal 
networks freely used by citizens and by open, bottom-up networks. In conclusion, WiFi 
networks can show both the features of a club good or a public good, depending on the 
provider  of  the  service  and  conditions  imposed  in  order  to  have  access  to  the 
infrastructure.
4.2.  The  functional  immaterial  level:  technical  standards,  domain  names,  
software.
Several  immaterial  resources  are  at  the  core  of  the  communication  process 
between  computers.  Technical  standards  and  protocols  enable  hardware  to  interact, 
fixing the rules of communication. 
Protocols and standards were originally created as public and non-rival goods, 
available to any user of the Internet community, in order to help to build an increasingly 
complex  and  widespread  network.  The  Internet  Engineering  Task  Force  (IETF) 
established  under  the  auspices  of  the  Internet  technical  community,  the  primordial 
attempt to set up a governance framework of the Net, from the early eighties developed 
such  protocols  and  left  them  open  and  public.  Moreover,  the  Internet  Society 
copyrighted them, in order to preserve their openness from any attempt to subtract them 
to free access. 
The Internet itself is then based on nonproprietary standards allowing for its end 
to end architecture to work, freely available to anyone and traditionally conceived as 
global public goods. For instance, HTTP protocol and HTML programming language 
were kept open by the inventor Tim Berners-Lee, in order to let other users help to 
develop them. 
On the contrary, many standards or technical aspects at the basis of file formats 
are covered by patent  law or copyright. Indeed, they are usually essential to exploit 
exclusively a software on the market.  In these cases – such as .doc other Microsoft 
formats – the resources are necessarily private and excludable, if not exclusive. They 
can be eventually shared only in case a license is given after the buying of the software 
and can therefore be included among the club goods.
Key-elements  of  this  layer  are  also IP addresses  and domain names.  From a 
taxonomic perspective, they can be considered private goods, since they are exclusively 
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managed by the Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). ICANN is a 
non-governmental  organization which is  allowed to confer the right  to use a certain 
domain name,  according to the first-come,  first-served rule,  as an expression of  the 
absence of formal hierarchical relationships in the Internet community.
Another  highly influential  group  of  resources  at  this  level  is  represented  by 
applications and software, that is to say all the resources which allow the computers to 
perform productive tasks, translating the contents from machine calculations to human 
language.  As  it  can  be  easily  understood  by  this  wide  definition,  software  and 
applications are not exclusively web resources: on the contrary, many of them work 
without  an  Internet  connection  and  perform  tasks  which  are  fundamental  to  the 
functioning of the computer machine (i.e.: operating systems, video and audio software 
and so forth). 
The nature of such resources is highly controversial. In fact, the initial impulse to 
the Net, during the seventies, was grounded on the open access principle, according to 
which the global Internet structure should have been strengthened by the contribution of 
the  users  themselves,  thanks  to  the  establishment  of  an  increasing number  of  local 
networks. The open access to source codes also permitted an easier solution to certain 
flaws of  the software  and  a more  efficient  configuration of  computers  to  safeguard 
individual  needs.  Nonetheless,  the  promising  commercial  value  of  such  resources 
fostered a diametrically opposed vision, expressed by Bill Gates in his “Open Letter to 
the Hobbysts” in 1976. In that document Mr. Gates laid the foundations of the software 
industry, explaining his view on the main reasons for limited access to source codes and 
the detrimental effects of open access principle for service providers. From that time on, 
the software layer has always developed on a dual basis, boosted at the same time by 
private  commercial  initiatives  of  IT  companies  and  the  efforts  to  promote  freely 
available software. The debate is also reflected in literature: some scholar underline the 
urgent need for protection of IT intellectual property rights, also in relation to Internet 
software;  according  to  others,  the  immaterial  resources  of  the  Internet  should  be 
supported  by  citizens’-led  knowledge  and  consensus  building  process,  asking  for 
everyone’s  contribution  to  find  collectively  solutions  and  further  developments  for 
growing social, cultural economic challenges (Greco, Floridi, 2004).
This is the reason why this category of immaterial resources can be numbered 
among private or public goods, on a case by case approach. Certain software –even 
essential to the daily activity of an user such as Internet Explore, Mozilla Firefox or 
Adobe Reader – are distributed for free, while several others are need to be bought and 
licensed.  Instead,  they  hypothetically  share  an  interesting  common  feature:  being 
immaterial goods in digital format, their codes could be copied without significant costs 
and loss of quality. This is in particular true for public access software; on the contrary, 
companies  usually  restrict  the  possibility  to  reproduce  the  codes  by  the  system  of 
licensing. In a word, software are theoretically non-rival consumption goods. Therefore, 
open source software can be classifies as public goods,  while  private ones are club 
goods.
4.3. The content layer.
Information is an essential component of the resources included into this layer. 
Thanks  to  technological  development,  the  digitalization  process  has  led  to  a  sharp 
change in the access to such resources,  either  in their quality and quantity.  Internet 
contents are immaterial goods in digital form and take the shape of different expressions 
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of human intellect: texts, music, videos, images, opinions and so forth. Hess and Ostrom 
have underlined the difficulty to develop an exhaustive analysis of this category, due to 
its fuzzy boundaries and continuous evolution. Nonetheless, they have tried to select 
three different kinds of information goods: artifacts, facilities and ideas. Artifacts are the 
expressions of an idea; facilities store and make them available; ideas are the immaterial 
core of an artifact and can be caught to understand the creative content, knowledge or 
information at the basis of an immaterial human-made product.
Traditional  physical  artifacts  are private goods,  but  their  digitalization allows 
them to be copied without loss of quality. From a theoretical point of view, the same file 
could be contextually used by several netsurfers, since the access by one of them does 
not entail  exclusion to the detriment of the others.  Nonetheless, the simple fact  that 
information is non-rival doesn’t automatically neutralize all the normative grounds for 
exclusion  and  their  enforcement  i.e.  through  judicial  remedies  or  public  authority. 
Indeed, in this field non-rival consumption has to be balanced with individual’s property 
and privacy.  Personal artifacts can therefore be protected from external  exploitation, 
depending on the sensitivity of the ideas expressed. On the contrary, many artifacts are 
commercially exploited or even freely edited on the web, as in the case of wikis, where 
users can share information and contribute to their development. In conclusion, access 
to artifacts – as well as to the ideas they express – can be strictly denied, regulated by 
intermediary solutions or totally free. According to the conditions set for the access to 
artifacts and their copies, these resources can be considered either public goods, club 
goods  or  definitely  private  goods.  The  same  trend  is  shown  by  digital  stores  and 
repositories, the facilities through which artifacts and ideas are made available. They 
typically fall among the club goods, but an increasing number of open access databases 
can be detected.
5. From individual attempts to solve the Rubik’s Cube to general applicable 
algorithms.  Internet  commons,  something  more  complex  than  a  twisty  puzzle: 
conclusions, challenges, perspectives.
5.1. The interconnection between private property and public Internet goods.
The analysis we have conducted till now has shown the main elements increasing 
the complexity of the Internet as a set of multi-faceted goods. If we take a look at this 
scenario from a general perspective, our eyes are first of all captured by a minimum 
common pattern: the constant interconnection between public and private essence of the 
resources involved.
On the one hand, this feature refers to each good individually concerned. First of 
all,  the  several  combinations  of  the  two  key-biophysical  elements  of  the  commons 
reveal the surprising absence of the option non-excludability/rival consumption. We can 
as a consequence point out that Net related resources can hardly be qualified as CPRs, 
one of the most frequent and highly investigated subset of common goods.
Secondly, on the contrary, easy exclusion combined with non-rival consumption 
is  widespread.  It  means  that  club  goods,  which  have  traditionally  been  playing  a 
secondary role in the masterpiece of the commons, are a core element at each of the 
three  layers  of  the  Net.  Moreover,  the  category  of  club  goods  itself  has  been 
strengthened and widened. In the past, it was mainly applied to low-scale and locally 
based communities, such as private parks or clubs, which were treated by scholars as a 
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sort of impurely private goods. Technological development has gradually led to expand 
the notion to almost public resources, which can gather millions of users all around the 
world at the same time. Nowadays, it embraces even globally spread resources: satellite 
services (on-pay television; GPS mapping),  electronic repositories of data or articles 
and, of course, many Internet clubs, including the use of certain software or the access 
to the network infrastructures.
Thirdly, many of the components of the three layers enjoy a dual essence. The 
same goods, with different institutional arrangements and in diversified situations, show 
the features of either private or public goods. Some of them can even fall into three 
categories – private, club and public goods – depending on the choices of the formal or 
informal actors responsible for their creation and the subsequent access policies.
Fourthly, the functioning of the Internet shows a constant  interaction between 
public  and  private  dimensions.  For  instance,  a  privately  owned  computer,  once 
connected to the Net, becomes a positive contributor to the ongoing communication 
processes  and  a  powerful  tool  to  link  individual’s  personal  sphere  to  the  web 
community.
Another  even more relevant  example regards  the search for  a proper  balance 
between public protocols, private commercially licensed software and private networks. 
Indeed,  the Internet  is  a sum of  privately owned and administered networks,  highly 
heterogeneous  because  of  their  different  owners:  families,  companies,  associations, 
public  authorities,  even  Internet  service  providers.  Internet  protocols  facilitate  the 
interoperability between such huge amount of exclusive networks, thereby allowing for 
privatization and decentralization of network management and policies.  At the same 
time,  the  close  link  between  common  standards  and  local  networks  translate  into 
practice the end to end rule, a fundamental Internet architectural principle according to 
which  the  network  provides  for  basic  communication  tools  only,  while  the 
implementation of the users’ specific applications is left to the devices connected to the 
ends of the network itself (Saltzer, Reed, Clark, 1984). 
The  principle  permits  the  Internet  to  work  as  a  neutral  platform,  where 
individuals  can  perform  their  activities,  provide  and  benefit  from  applications  and 
services  independent  from  the  immaterial  backbone  of  freely  available  technical 
standards  and  protocols  (Mueller,  2002).  As  already  mentioned,  for  instance, 
communication capabilities of Skype can be implemented without the permission or any 
interference  by  the  network  providers,  who  just  enable  the  coordination  between 
different  individuals’ ends.  In  conclusion,  at  the individual  end level  of  each users’ 
computer,  the  Internet  is  private  and  exclusive;  at  the  protocol  layer,  instead,  it  is 
nonproprietary and open: the private sphere (either the individual one and the stage of 
commercial  exploitation  of  material  devices  and  software)  and  the  public  goods 
complement  each  other  in  order  to  foster  the  Internet  growth  and  the  reduction  of 
barriers to access.
5.2. Common resources, the broadband and the principle of network neutrality.
Despite  its  fundamental  importance,  the  end to  end  principle seems to  be at 
stake.  Since the diffusion of  new technologies on broadband,  a  highly controversial 
debate has been reflecting a magmatic search for a renegotiation between the private 
and public components of the Internet.
In  the  recent  past,  the  narrowband  technology  confined  the  Internet  to 
asynchronous  exchange  of  data.  In  such  a  context,  a  single  regulated  monopolistic 
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company  could  provide  basic  infrastructures  for  web  communication  on  a 
fundamentally equal basis to other companies. On the contrary, under this perspective, 
broadband technology is highly critical, as it allows for competition among networks. 
Therefore, large sized companies con establish their own network, competing with other 
providers. The capital-intensive investments needed to set up alternative infrastructures 
make a significant selection of the actors on the stage, so that only a few companies 
compete. Moreover, in several States the exploitation of broadband is not regulated and 
supervised by a public authority, since this regime is usually left for telecommunication 
services. Institutional choices therefore foster this rush to the top among selected market 
actors, indirectly putting under pressure the principle of neutrality of the network.
The arguments raised by the supporters of the opposing views to a large extent 
reflect the traditional grounds for privatization or openness of digital resources.
Efficiency, reduction of costs, better management and improved services are the 
main points remarked by opponents of Net neutrality, who sometimes even stress the 
importance of a stricter control over the contents in order to maximize the value of the 
communication processes and of the applications available for consumers (Yoo, 2007). 
Besides  this,  also  spurring  technological  innovation  and  safeguarding  free  market 
competition are  listed as  critical  values.  In  fact,  it  has  been  argue  that  neutralizing 
networks means standardizing products and services,  thereby preventing competitive 
differentiation and creating stumbling blocks to capital investments for the construction 
of new facilities. Another interesting theme is the possibility to transpose competition 
among networks also in the field of the contents of the Net, the resources the users price 
the most and expect to have access to on nondiscriminatory basis.
On the other side, supporters of Net neutrality remark that this principle is not 
property of the Internet: instead, it is Internet, as it expresses its core essence and the 
main impulse to its gradual growth, as from its origins till now. Common property of 
Internet protocols then has been and is the premise for any technical improvement of the 
network and the possibility to benefit from its resources freely and equally. As a matter 
of fact,  Internet has evolved thanks to a series of informal rules which have always 
oriented and inspired its development: decentralization; individuals’ contribution to its 
technical growth and to its contents; the attempt to break down limits to access to the 
network; respect for minority views; strong efforts to reach consensus; involvement of 
public authorities or international specialized organizations in the management of the 
key-resources for the common benefit.
Once again, the duel takes place on a fine thread representing the balance and the 
interconnection between the private and public sides of the Internet, the expectations of 
a bottom-up and decentralized Internet community and the attempts to subject it to the 
chains of exclusivity and subtractability. 
5.3. Domain names and IP addresses: advances and pitfalls of the centralized 
management of common resources.
The policies concerning the allocation and assignment of domain names and IP 
addresses are another critical question, which mainly refers to the problem of the model 
of global governance of the web (Oddenino, 2008). This is due to the fact that they are 
the only identifiers enabling the direction of data through the Net. Being unique, they 
need to be coordinated at  global  level and assigned exclusively to specific  users,  in 
order to ensure the uniformity and compatibility of the whole system.
Since the beginning of the Internet revolution, the strategic importance of such 
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immaterial resources was clear. Their management entailed significant policy choices, 
but also huge economic expectations deriving from the markets of domain names and IP 
addresses registration. Therefore, the US Government decided to award on a temporary 
basis the function of domain names registration to a  small  company – the Network 
Solutions Inc. (NSI) – under the scrutiny of US public authorities. In 1997 the contract 
expired and the US Government had to choose between the privatization of the sector 
and its maintenance under the aegis of public power. In the first case, the NSI would 
have inherited a  de facto monopoly:  therefore,  potential  competitors  and other  civil 
society bodies claimed for the second solution.
The Government actually walked the second way, by awarding a central role to 
the ICANN, a Californian non-profit corporation established ad hoc to perform the task 
to neutralized such strategic resources and supervised by the US Government, namely 
the Department of Commerce. Even if the organization is subject to Californian law, the 
effects of its  activity are global,  since it  is responsible for the administration of the 
domain name system and Internet addressing system roots (Mueller, 2009). The roots 
were recognized as common resources, in relation to which no private property could be 
conceived, but a centralized system of allocation based on trusteeship at any level of the 
Internet global community. The same institutional choices were taken as to second-level 
domain names, whose regime is once again focused on the role of the ICANN.
The establishment of a collective governance of the domain name system was 
not intended to replace private market in domain name registrations, but to facilitate it, 
in particular providing a neutral institutional background for the global regulation of 
domain name registries and users, granting equal access to the registry. The system also 
aimed at  avoiding the raise of  dominant  and exclusive property rights  in  a  delicate 
sector for the whole functioning of the Internet.
The activity of ICANN has resulted in a partial success, but is currently facing 
major challenges. Despite remarkable outcomes in the market of second-level domain 
name  registration,  spread  criticism  has  been  raised  as  to  the  functioning  of  the 
commons-oriented  governance  system  it  leads.  The  main  question  is  therefore  the 
effective implementation of globally uniform policies,  which has often proven to be 
controversial and difficult, due to the various and often opposing interests at stake. The 
need to search for accountability and to reach consensus of influential interest groups 
has resulted in powerlessness and stasis.  Such situation is  almost paradoxical,  if  we 
consider the rush of the Internet towards always new winning posts.
At  the  same  time,  while  ICANN  strives  to  maintain  the  unity  and  global 
dimension  of  the  Internet,  the  web  is  a  battlefield  for  national  sovereignty,  which 
overlaps  its  claims of  control  and policy choices  over  the  resource.  States  are then 
allowed to play a double-hat role. On the one hand, they often aim at imposing a direct 
contribution to the management of the Internet – for instance through the administration 
of country codes – causing the phenomenon of balkanization of the web. On the other 
hand, according to their legal orders, they can limit or deny access to the contents of the 
web, built parallel and autonomous infrastructures to secure and control users’ activities, 
but can also censor, control or delete its contents. Therefore, even if the ICANN follows 
complex multi-stakeholders deliberative procedures and is supported in its activity by 
further  international  bodies  representing  the  various  social  categories  at  stake,  the 
administration of the resource is still quite far from fitting the specific features of the 
Internet as a commons well.
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